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ABSTRACT 
As perishable products are worthless at end-of-life, for a given supply prices are often dynamically adjusted to 
ensure inventory is exhausted at end-of-life. When consumers expect such price reductions, they may strategically 
time their purchases. These two conditions pose a complex problem for pricing.  Given inventory, cost of production 
is sunk. Thus, the dynamic path for prices must be set to maximize revenues with an eye on inventory take-down as 
well as to discourage strategic behavior. This problem is further challenged when prices and the extent of consumer 
strategic behavior are uncertain. This paper presents an approach for pricing a set of perishable products that are 
highly substitutable, yet differentiated to target a set of consumer segments. We propose and analyze a price 
assurance scheme as a solution to the strategic behavior of consumers and price uncertainty. We present and 
evaluate our price assurance approach by comparing two price assurance schemes: i) ex-post price assurance, and 
ii) ex-ante price assurance to risk neutral dynamic pricing without regard for consumer strategic behavior.   These 
approaches have not to our knowledge been previously considered in our setting of perishables, uncertain 
consumer strategic behavior, and price uncertainty. Our numerical experiments show that our robust optimization 
model prevents loss when a firm encounters the worst-case demand and outperforms a risk neutral pricing model. 
Comparison across our different pricing schemes provides conditions under which particular schemes may dominate 
others.  
Keywords: Dynamic pricing, price assurance, perishables, product differentiation, strategic consumers, revenue 
maximization, robust optimization. 
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1 Introduction 
Management of the economic performance implications of product perishability is a critical component 
of firm-level profitability. Product perishability may follow from physical attribute dynamics, attribute 
functional obsolescence, or evolution of buyer preferences.  Food sector examples are well-known where 
product life is short, stochastic in duration, and often requires process or intervention to manage product 
life, e.g. cool misting fresh vegetables. Digital products are often viewed as having high degrees of 
attribute obsolescence. Consumer preferences clearly evolve as can be seen in food attribute 
preferences. The term “fashionable” highlights preference evolution that often leads to viral shifts in 
demand or more gradual preference diminution. In many cases, such shifts can be abrupt as consumers 
switch purchases to products characterized by new bundles of attributes.  Services provide examples 
where service-life abruptly goes to zero, e.g. when a flight departs or a hotel room day is closed as vacant 
at day’s end. Information technology has enabled rapid assessment of consumer demand, just -in-time 
production, and rapid coordination/control technologies, enabling a dramatic expansion of the supply of 
highly differentiated and substitutable products and services that can be targeted at increasingly granular 
consumer segments with rapidly evolving preferences. However, those same IT developments have 
facilitated strategic behavior by customers in response to anticipated dynamics of product availability, 
attributes, as well as price. That is, anticipating price dynamics, consumers may act strategically to time 
their purchases, e.g. postponing purchase to wait for anticipated price reductions.  
From the firm’s perspective, this environment implies consumer demand has become characterized by 
four important features: 1) uncertainty such that the underlying stochastic process is not obvious and 
often involves discrete jumps and dynamic, 2) increasingly granular across a wide spectrum of 
differentiated products serving different market segments, 3) discontinuity between demand and price as 
consumers switch purchases across products, and 4) strategic behavior by consumers who postpone 
purchase in anticipation of price reductions.   
We adopt and extend the Weaver and Moon dynamic pricing model to address these features.   Following 
Weaver & Moon, we consider dynamic pricing model based on robust optimization to deri ve dynamic 
pricing that is consistent with the presence of highly differentiated substitutes, uncertainty of demand, 
heterogeneity across consumer segments, and strategic behavior by consumers.  We consider as a base 
case where the firm is risk neutral and forms price policy using expectations or point forecasts of 
demand. We label this pricing scheme as risk neutral pricing as it derives optimal price dynamics are risk 
neutral on point forecasts consistent with risk neutrality.  This conception supposes the firm has 
knowledge of the underlying stochastic distribution of demand.  While Weaver and Moon presented price 
policy that is responsive to the first three features of demand noted above, they did not present price 
policy that responds to strategic behavior of consumers. We extend their model to consider two forms of 
price assurance as approaches to mitigate the revenue impacts of strategic behavior by consumers. We 
consider two types of price assurance policy. We consider an ex-post price assurance policy that promises 
a refund of price reduction to customers who have paid a price that has been subsequently reduced.  We 
consider a second policy that we label as ex-ante price assurance in which optimal dynamic prices are 
derived to explicitly avoid refund liability. While the ex-post price assurance model has been considered 
by Lai et al. 2009, to our knowledge we present the first consideration of ex-ante price assurance and a 
direct comparison of three different pricing strategies (risk neutral, ex-post, and ex-ante). Our approach 
also extends the literature on price assurance by incorporation of highly differentiated, substitutable 
products that are also perishable as well as by consideration of true uncertainty with a robust 
optimization approach. Our model provides a discrete-time, dynamic price profile within a context where 
the firm cannot replenish inventory. Section 2 provides a brief review of literature regarding perishable 
product pricing, customer’s behavior and price assurance, as well as robust optimization. Section 3 
presents our risk neutral pricing model as well as variations consistent with two price assurance policies 
(ex-post and ex-ante). Section 4 explores the implications of our proposed price assurance policies using 
numerical experiments. Section 5 presents discussion and conclusions. 
2 Past Work 
As reviewed by Weaver and Moon (2018), an extensive literature exists that considers the revenue 
management and dynamic pricing problem for perishable products.  The Weaver and Moon (2018) model 
for dynamic pricing incorporated several key features noteworthy: multiple, substitutable products that 
are perishable, uncertain demand by a heterogeneous, segmented population of consumers, and 
strategic behavior by consumers who time purchases to exploit anticipated mark-downs. The relevance of 
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multiple, substitutable products introduces the potential for pricing of one product to cannibalize other 
products. That is, consider management of a vast set of products that are close substitutes  such that 
consumers can switch within the set depending on price and preferences.  A change in a particular 
product price will impact the demand and revenue for other products through smooth substitution or 
abrupt switching. This implies that pricing across the set of products must be accomplished through joint 
consideration of the demand interdependence. Consumer heterogeneity implies management can 
position products and their pricing to segment the market, allowing for an approximation of price 
discrimination effects. Finally, the strategic behavior of consumers across the products is influenced by 
budget constraints as noted by Bitran et al. 2006. Zhang and Cooper 2005 and 2009 considered dynamic 
pricing of the multiple substitutable flights and provided bounds to the optimal revenue using a heuristics 
solution approach. Digital media enables customers to observe price dynamics and are enabled to plan 
the timing of purchase. Su 2007 developed an intertemporal pricing model which considers 
heterogeneous customer preferences as well as different degrees of patience. Aviv and Pazgal 2008 also 
consider patience. Firm-level pricing with consumer price taking implies the firm can be viewed as a 
leader in a Stackelberg game. Aviv and Pazgal 2008 consider performance of a pre-announced fixed 
discount policy. Both Aviv and Pazgal 2008 and Levin et al. 2009 show that customer strategic behavior 
generally will reduce firm revenues.   
An alternative response to consumer strategic behavior is to adopt a price assurance policy. Such a policy 
dissolves incentives for consumers to postpone purchase.  Levin et al. 2007 presented a price assurance 
model in a monopolistic setting where customers are reimbursed for the price difference between a 
purchase price and a reduced price that occurs after purchase. Customers are partitioned into three 
segments: 1) do not buy, 2) buy without and 3) buy with a price guarantee option. Levin et al. show that 
faced with uncertain dynamic pricing, a price assurance option has option value.  Lai, et al. 2009 further 
studied such an ex-post price assurance policy specifying consumers as strategic with total demand 
uncertainty. That is, price adjustment occurs ex-post a price change. Under their ex-post price assurance 
specification price is derived in a risk neutral setting and refunds are paid after a price reduction occurs. 
They found that the policy eliminates strategic consumer postponement.  
To proceed, we note the need for consideration of uncertainty in our problem setting. Much of past 
literature has not considered risk or uncertainty. Risk neutral settings have received limited consideration 
while uncertainty noted by Weaver and Moon 2018 more accurately characterizes the setting. Bertsimas 
and Sim 2004 noted the sensitivity of dynamic pricing to stochastic specifications. In particular, risk 
neutral specifications ignore the implications for performance of worst case scenarios and are difficult to 
implement when characteristics of the underlying stochastic distribution are unknown.  The idea behind 
robust optimization is to consider the worst case scenario without a specific distribution assumption. 
Ben-Tal and Nemirovski 1999, Bertsimas and Sim 2003, and Ben-Tal et al. 2004 addressed models that 
define different uncertainty sets such as an ellipsoidal, polyhedral and cardinality set. The robust 
optimization method has been widely used in many different applications such as finance and 
transportation area to respond to uncertainty while preventing a certain degree of loss. We adopt the 
Weaver and Moon (2008) specification as briefly presented below and extend it to consider price 
assurance. Our price assurance policies are illustrated using numerical experiments and show that 
performance under price assurance dominates previous dynamic pricing presented by Weaver and Moon 
(2018).  
3 Model Overview 
In this section, we summarize our approach as based on several key components. First, we suppose the 
producer has produced a set of differentiated, perishable products.  A good example might be cut 
Christmas trees of different varies and heights, harvested fruit with different characteristics, or  cell 
phones. Cost of production is already paid, so it is a sunk cost.  We suppose consumers are different, 
heterogeneous, and can be thought of as composing a set of stratified, different consumer segments, 
each with different demand functions ranging from one with the highest willingness-to-pay to the lowest. 
We assume demand for each product is responsive to its own price as well as the price of the other 
products. We suppose demand goes to zero at the end of product life, or market season.  We assume the 
producer has estimates of each segment’s demand functions and so can predict, though with error, 
demand given a set of prices. Thus, the producer cases uncertainty with respect to segment specific 
demand. We assume the producer and consumer knows the product life and the need for the producer to 
sell available inventory. Thus, we suppose that some consumers may act strategically by postponing 
purchase in hope of paying a lower price. This is a very real setting faced for most products with a 
product life.  
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For the producer, the challenge is to set a dynamic path for prices across the set of products to maximize 
revenue given the setting faced in the market. Price could be set as fixed throughout the product life, or 
an ad hoc adjustment might be done through a sale at some point in time. However, we assume the 
producer will choose a dynamic path for prices that reflects the market setting and optimizes revenue 
performance. Given demand is stochastic, for a base case, we suppose the producer is risk neutral and  
chooses an optimal price path to maximize expected revenue conditional on the producer’s estimates of 
strategic behavior by consumers. Next, we generalize the problem to suppose the producer faces true 
uncertainty with respect to demand, i.e. the producer can only describe the boundaries (worse and best 
cases) for demand. In this setting, we suppose the producer sets dynamic price paths through robust 
optimization. Further, within this setting we evaluate two pricing policies we call ex-post and ex-ante 
price assurance. That is, for ex-post price assurance, we suppose the producer seeks to mitigate strategic 
postponement by consumers by offering to refund the price difference between the purchase price paid 
and lowest price available during the marketing season. Next, we consider an alternative price assurance 
policy where the producer derives an robust dynamic price path such that consumers can be guaranteed 
that prices are not reduced within the market season. This, of course, is enforced by a constraint on the 
producer’s robust optimization problem.  
To proceed, we briefly summarize notation for our model and refer the reader to the appendix for details.  




J # of products offered by producer, Jj ,...,1=  
t time date within market season, Tt ,...1,0=  
T End date of market season, product life length 
s Consumer segment, },...,2,1{0 SSs =  
)0(jsq  
Initial product inventory available to segment s 
 Product inventory at time t 
)(tp js  
Price of product j set for demand segment s at time t 
 Demand by segment s at time t for product j 
)(tjs  
Proportion of consumers in demand segment s at time t who 
postpone purchase of product j  
)(ta js  
market potential for product j and segment s at time t 
 price sensitivity of product j 
)(tjs  
price sensitivity of substitutes for product j 
 
Demand for substitutable, perishable products 
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We assume that each segment prefers finding substitutable products rather than downgrading or 
upgrading to a different segment’s product set. For example, price sensitive customers want to purchase 
an airline ticket among substitutable business class flights rather than to upgrade from an economy class 
ticket.  
Demand postponement by Strategic Consumers 
Building on Su and Zhang 2008 and Lai, et al. 2009, we assume strategic behavior by customers occurs 
through postponement of purchase. The result is that demand at time t is pushed into the next time 
period 1+t . We define the cumulative demand function as )(
~
tjs  as:  
 























−− +−−−=  , jsTt ,,...1 =  
 





− ) is postponed, and a proportion of demand from 
the previous time )1(
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j
s   is brought to the current time. This leads to total demand at time t as 
the square-bracketed portion which in turn is subject to further postponement by some consumers.   
 
Dynamic Risk Neutral Pricing of Perishables 
We assume the firm’s management problem involves setting a dynamic price path to maximize expected 
revenue from each consumer segment based on several constraints: 1) initial and current inventory, 2) 
current total demand given past and current postponement, and 3) demand, price, and inventory must be 
non-negative. Expected revenue is defined at the summation over products, segments, and time of 
expected price times expected quantity purchased.  
Weaver-Moon Pricing under uncertainty with robust optimization 
In contrast to the case of risk neutral dynamic pricing, to consider price assurance we now consider a 
more realistic setting where we suppose the firm has limited knowledge of the stochastic properties of 
product and segment specific demand. Faced with such uncertainty, we characterize the optimal price 
profiles as following from a robust optimization following i.e. Lan, et al. 2008 Birbil, et al. 2009, Weaver 
and Moon. 2018. Our proposed robust optimization model follows Soyster 1973 and Ben-Tal and 
Nemirovski 1999. At the core of this approach, we suppose the values of stochastic variables such as 
potential demand fall with a set values defined by a range of deviation around a mean value, so e.g. for 
potential demand: 
                            
This uncertainty set can be defined to be consistent with a particular setting. For example, it can be made 
less conservative by assuming many different types of uncertainty set or robust counterpart s such as 
ellipsoidal and polyhedral uncertainty sets as considered by Ben-Tal and Nemirovski 1999 and Bertsimas 
and Sim 2004. Given the uncertainty set, the optimal price policy should satisfy the revenue optimization 
problem presented above. To proceed, it is practice to translate the problem into tractable form as 
reported in the Appendix. Weaver and Moon 2018 showed that this robust optimization model sets prices 
lower than a risk neutral model. This implies that a firm attempts to expand sales and inventory to draw 
down inventory by setting prices lower under uncertain demand. Their results also illustrated segment-
specific pricing that reflects a preference ordering across consumer segments that sets boundary 
thresholds beyond which pricing can induce consumers to switch products. They also illustrate that 
robust pricing dominates risk neutral pricing across a range of performance criteria.  Compared to risk 
neutral pricing, robust pricing is shown to result in more stable prices as well as revenue over time.  
Dynamic Pricing with Price Assurance  
We extend the Weaver and Moon 2018 robust optimization model to incorporate price assurance policy.  
We consider both ex-post and ex-ante price assurance policy based on respective robust pricing models 
and then compare the performance implications of the policies.  Given the two price policies, we are able 
to evaluate the following proposition.  
Proposition 1. Given demand uncertainty, the proportion of strategic customer postponement )(tjs  is 
reduced by a policy of robust price assurance relative to that under a risk neutral pricing policy.  
While Lai, et al. 2009 found price assurance policy eliminates consumer postponement under risk neutral 
pricing, our extended proposition considers the implication of price assurance within a context of 
uncertainty.  
Under ex-post price assurance, we specify that the firm offers to refund the price difference between the 
purchase price at time t  ( )(tp js ) and lowest price available in the marketing season. We suppose the 
refund is claimed by a proportion of buyers < 1. This policy comes at a direct cost that is simply the 
proportion of claims made times total purchases times the difference between price paid and lowest 
price in the season at some time , i.e.  
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This cost must be incorporated as a reduction in revenue to define the robust price assurance model as 
reported in the Appendix. 
Ex-ante price assurance 
As an alternative to the ex-post price assurance policy, we consider price policy that dynamically prices to 
eliminate refund liability by applying the intuitive condition that prices are not reduced within the market 
season, i.e. the following constraint is set on the optimal price path as shown in the Appendix:  
)1()( − tptp js
j
s  for Tt ,...,1= . 
4 Performance Implications of Price Assurance  
Here, we consider the performance implications of three dynamic pricing methods: i) risk neutral without 
considering price assurance, ii) robust ex-post price assurance and iii) robust ex-ante price assurance.  
These problems are not analytic and so, we illustrate their implications and establish their tractability 
using numerical methods within the context of a set of numerical experiments. Our numerical 
experiments are based on parameterization in Table 2 used by Weaver and Moon 2018. As in that paper, 
our goal is to illustrate how the approach can be used by illustrating it within the context plausible 
parameter values. For further applications, estimates of these parameters could be used based on the 
specific applied setting of interest. To summarize, estimates would be needed for 4 parameters for each 





and proportion of strategic consumers )(tjs  ), one parameter describing the bounds of the uncertainty 
set, )(tjs , and a parameter describing the proportion of consumers that would claim a refund under ex -
poste price assurance, . Thus, in a particular applied setting such relatively little information (in the 
form of parameter estimates) is needed.  
Table 2. 
Parameters for 2=j , 2=s , 10=T  
Parameters 
Product 1 Product 2 
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 1 Segment 2 
)(ta js  60 120 30 100 
)(tjs  0.5 1.5 0.6 1.6 
)(tjs  0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 
)(tjs  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
)(ts  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
)(tjs  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
)0(jq  100 400 80 300 
 
The experiments are implemented using MATLAB and GAMS on a machine with Windows XP OS, T2300 
CPU, 1.66 GHz, and 1 GB RAM.  
Implications of uncertainty and customer behavior  
As noted by Bertsimas and Sim 2004, the specification of stochastic forces in the problem faced by the 
firm will clearly affect performance of the firm’s choices.  In our risk neutral price policy, we assume the 
firm knows the underlying distribution of demand stochastics and uses expected demand functions in its 
derivation of optimal price. In our price assurance cases, we suppose the firm faces uncertainty, not risk, 
and can only characterize the bounds of the uncertainty set of demands it faces. By comparing robust 
price assurance results with those for the risk neutral price policy, we can evaluate the implications of 
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uncertainty and schemes that attempt to reduce its revenue implications.  The performance of each 
dynamic pricing method depends on the nature of consumer behavior with respect to propensities to 
postpone and to claim refunds. We define contR , postR , anteR  as revenue generated by a risk neutral, ex-
post price assurance, and ex-ante price assurance policies, respectively. We consider revenue 
performance across our price policy schemes and across a range of values characterizing consumer 
postponement ( )(tjs ) and consumer propensity to claim refunds ( )(tws ). The results are reported in 
Table 3.  
Table 3. 
Simulation experiments for different customer behaviors 
)(tjs  0 0.1 0.2 0.2 
w
s
(t) postR  anteR  postR  anteR  postR  anteR  contR  
0.3 5.9556e+004 6.3480e+004 4.8749e+004 8.5010e+003 4.6388e+004 8.1104e+003 4.6854e+004 
0.5 5.8568e+004 6.3480e+004 4.8453e+004 8.5010e+003 4.6077e+004 8.1104e+003 4.6854e+004 
0.7 5.7059e+004 6.3480e+004 4.8158e+004 8.5010e+003 4.5766e+004 8.1104e+003 4.6854e+004 
0.9 5.6251e+004 6.3480e+004 4.7862e+004 8.5010e+003 4.5456e+004 8.1104e+003 4.6854e+004 
 
We first suppose the presence of price assurance does not affect strategic behavior by consumers. That 
is, we consider the case where the proportion of postponed demand by strategic consumers is the same 
under each price policy. For )(tjs =0.2, comparing the last two columns of Table 2, smaller revenues are 
achieved under ex-post and ex-ante price assurance relative a risk neutral pricing policy. Compared to risk 
neutral pricing revenue contR , the revenue reduction for ex-post price assurance is small, ranging from -
0.99% to -0.029% for propensity to claim refunds w
s
(t) from 0.3 to 0.9. Compared to risk neutral pricing 
revenue, revenue reduction for ex-ante price assurance is substantial at -82.7%. These results suggest 
that ex-post price assurance can be costly depending on the consumer propensity to claim refunds, 
however the revenue reduction for ex-ante price assurance is shown to be substantial. Based on results 
reported by Weaver and Moon 2018 for revenue variation with respect to the extent of uncer tainty,  , 
the reductions in revenue could be greater. This cost of revenue reduction is incurred directly in refunds 
under ex-post assurance and as a result of constraints under ex-ante assurance. As propensity to claim 
refunds increases under ex-post assurance, Table 3 shows the revenue difference is slightly reduced 
between ex-post versus ex-ante price assurance. 
We now consider the case where price assurance policy reduces the extent of strategic consumer 
behavior. Proposition 1 supposes that price assurance would lead consumers to reduce their strategic 
postponement.  If the offer of price assurance eliminates strategic behavior by consumers ( )(tjs =0), 
Table 3 shows that both price assurance policies provide increased revenue relative to the risk neutral 
model. Comparing across columns in Table 3, when postponement exists, we see that ex -post and ex-ante 
revenues decrease as the propensity to postpone purchases increases.  Table 3 also provides a 
comparison of revenue performance under price assurance for )(tjs =0 versus risk neutral price policy 
without price assurance for )(tjs =0.2. In other words, this comparison supposes postponement is 
eliminated by offering price assurance. Results in Table 3 indicate that if strategic behavior were 
eliminated, then under ex-ante price assurance revenue would increase relative to both risk neutral 
dynamic pricing and ex-post assurance. Relative to risk neutral dynamic pricing, ex-ante price assurance 
would increase revenue by 35.5% while ex-post would increase revenue by 27.1%. As propensity to claim 
refunds increases, ex-post price assurance revenue decreases. Comparing the price assurance policies, 
the ex-ante model outperforms the ex-post model for )(tjs =0. If price assurance policy only reduces 
strategic behavior, results for )(tjs =0.1 show that only ex-post assurance would result in increased 
revenues.  
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Time-variant demand  
Numerical experiments so far have been reported for time-invariant demands. However, in the real 
world, a firm anticipates increasing or decreasing demand over time. Thus, in this subsection, we 
investigate how revenues change for increasing or decreasing demand conditions. First, we consider the 
case of decreasing demand, in other words,  
    a
s
j (t) > a
s
j (t +1), Tt ,...,1=  
 
Then, we examine which policy would be more beneficial when demand decreases. For numerical 
experiments, we assume parameters as follows and keep other parameters the same as in Table 2: 
ktta −= 60)(11 , ktta −=120)(
1
2 , ktta −= 30)(
2
1 , and ktta −=100)(
2
2 , for ++k .  
)(tjs =0.2 for a risk neutral model,  
)(tjs =0 for an ex-ante and an ex-post model 
)(tws =0.7 for an ex-ante model  
The results for decreasing demands are described in Table 4 and the left panel (a) in Figure 1.   
 
Table 4. 
Simulation experiments for decreasing demands (values in parenthesis represents rate of decrement, w
s
(t)=0.7) 
k  conR  postR  anteR  
0 4.6854e+004   5.7059e+004 6.3480e+004 
1 4.1434e+004 (-11.6%) 4.7689e+004 (-16.2%) 5.4607e+004 (-14.0%) 
2 3.5318e+004 (-14.8%) 3.2438e+004 (-32.0%) 5.0602e+004 (-7.3%) 
3 1.6396e+004 (-53.6%) 6.2442e+003 (-80.8%) 3.0674e+004 (-39.4%) 
 
  
Figure 1. The impact of time-varying demand on different pricing models (a) decreasing demand (left), (b) increasing 
demand (right), w
s
(t)=0.7, risk neutral case is indicated as contingent. 
 
Using similar scenarios, we investigate the impact of increasing total demand over time and compare the 
three pricing schemes. To express increasing demand over time, we assume parameters as follows:  
ktta += 60)(11 , ktta +=120)(
1
2 , ktta += 30)(
2
1 , and ktta +=100)(
2
2  for ++k .  
The results are presented in Table 5 and Figure 1b. Under each growth rate scenario, ex-post price 
assurance dominates risk neutral pricing and ex-ante price dominates ex-post price assurance with 
respect to revenue.  
As with experiments with respect to strategic behavior and propensity to claim refunds, these results 
show dramatically that the revenue implications of price assurance schemes strongly depend on market 
conditions and consumer behavioral response. In a mature market where demand is not expanding, price 
assurance policy may reduce revenues. Faced with declining demand with high propensity to claim 
refunds, ex ante price assurance may be very beneficial.  Similar to the case of decreasing demands, the 
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ex-ante model has the smallest rate of change in revenue performance as demand growth is increased. 
Ex-post price assurance and risk neutral pricing is most nonlinear in their rates of change in revenue.  
Table 5. 
Simulation experiments for increasing demands (values in parenthesis represent rate of increase, w
s
(t)=0.7) 
k  conR  postR  anteR  
0 4.6854e+004 5.7059e+004 6.3480e+004 
1 4.7128e+004 (0.6%) 5.9136e+004 (3.6%) 7.0074e+004 (10.4%) 
2 5.1732e+004 (9.8%) 6.0781e+004 (2.8%) 7.6802e+004 (9.6%) 
3 6.2379e+004 (20.6%) 7.9116e+004 (30.2%) 8.3775e+004 (9.1%) 
5 Conclusions and further Studies 
In this paper, we presented and evaluate three methods for dynamic pricing of per ishables: i) risk neutral 
ii) ex-post price assurance, and iii) ex-ante price assurance. By applying a robust optimization method, we 
presented robust dynamic pricing policies under demand uncertainty which guarantee a certain level of 
performance for possible scenarios, even for the worst-case scenario. In other words, our robust models 
can prevent a realization of a negative demand shock from impacting revenue significantly. Then, we 
compared different pricing schemes incorporating price assurance schemes. The revenue performance 
implications of consumer strategic behavior and propensity to claim refunds under various market 
demand dynamic conditions. Our numerical experiments show that robust price policy tends to stabilize 
revenues. Results indicate that the revenue implications of negative demand shocks are mitigated by 
robust policy and can result in greater revenues that under risk neutral price policy.  Our results show that 
price assurance policy outperforms a risk neutral pricing model, when it can eliminate or significantly 
reduce the customer’s strategic postponement of purchases. We find this feature of consumer behavior 
may be a more important element of revenue management that the propensity to claim refunds.  When 
demand is anticipated to be trending and with respect to revenue enhancement, we find the ex-ante 
pricing model dominates other dynamic pricing method.   
With respect to further research, following the suggestion of  Bertsimas and Sim 2004, our results 
encourage future research to explore how uncertainty conditions may affect revenue performance of 
dynamic price policy. Our approach and results motivate future applications across perishable products.   
While many product production processes and supply chains have been re-designed to be just-in-time, 
many product and service supplies are inherently time-intensive. This implies production and market 
supply must be based on estimates of uncertain demand. Often, supply realized is also highly stochastic. 
This market condition deserves further research as an extension of the dynamic pricing problems 
presented here.  
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Appendix: Mathematical Model (see notation in Table 1) 
Revenue maximization under risk neutrality  
Initial inventories are defined in equation (6), demand is described by equations (2)-(4).  Given our 
specification of ordered segments, to specify products as differentiated products across different 
segments, we introduce the constraint (8) following Birbil, et al. 2009. This implies that products in 
0Ss  have lower prices than higher cost products marketed for segment 0' Ss . Note that the equality 
holds when a firm does not need to distinguish between the two segments. The revenue optimization 
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We interpret this problem as a risk neutral pricing approach that is consistent with risk neutrality given 
that demand parameters can be viewed as expectations of stochastic parameters.   
Robust optimization for dynamic pricing 
We adopt the following deterministic form that is consistent with risk neutral use of expectations as 
equivalent to our problem (see appendix A in Weaver and Moon (2018) for derivation): 
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s  , 0' Sss           (22) 
Ex-ante price assurance 
Adding this constraint to our robust optimization problem, we derive the ex-ante price assurance policy 
as follows:  
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